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Self-regulation research increasingly highlights the performance trade-offs of different 
motivational states. For instance, eager motivation promotes performance on divergent creativity 
tasks (e.g., brainstorming), and vigilant motivation (e.g., proofreading) promotes performance on 
convergent analytic tasks. Recent work on metamotivation – people’s understanding and 
regulation of their motivational states – shows that, on average, people demonstrate accurate 
knowledge of how to create such task-motivation fit for eager and vigilant tasks; at the same 
time, there is significant variability in this accuracy (Scholer & Miele, 2016). The present 
research examines whether having accurate metamotivational knowledge predicts performance. 
Results revealed that more accurate metamotivational knowledge predicted better performance 
on proofreading and brainstorming tasks, though there was variability in the robustness of this 
effect across studies. Potential implications of this variability are discussed. By demonstrating 
the role of metamotivational knowledge in performance, this research offers novel insights for 
metamotivation research and highlights the advantages of taking a metamotivational approach to 
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There is no way around it: succeeding at our goals can be difficult. Different goals place 
distinct performance demands on us (Avnet & Higgins, 2003; Freitas & Higgins, 2002; Lee & 
Aaker, 2004; Woolley & Fishbach, 2015), and they never stop calling. Yet responding 
effectively pays off: Individuals who navigate their goals effectively experience benefits in a 
number of diverse areas, including higher life satisfaction, better psychological adjustment, 
better interpersonal relations, and fewer health issues (Briki, 2018; de Ridder et al., 2012; 
Mokdad et al., 2004; Tangney et al., 2004). Because self-regulatory success plays such a crucial 
role in so many significant life outcomes, it is not surprising that there has been great interest in 
understanding what makes some people perform better on their goals than others.  
Not surprisingly, research has revealed a number of answers to when and why some 
people are more likely than others to perform well on their goals. Some approaches have focused 
on differences in general capacities or vulnerabilities, such as people’s general ability to regulate 
their thoughts, emotions, and behavior (i.e., trait self-regulation; Carver & Scheier, 1982, 1998; 
Vohs & Baumeister, 2004), superior executive functions (Hofmann et al., 2012; Miyake & 
Friedman, 2012), or cue-reactivity (Boswell & Kober, 2016). Other approaches have looked 
outside the individual to general contextual factors that influence performance, such as the 
availability of temptations in one's environment (Milyavskaya & Inzlicht, 2017), environments 
that nudge individuals towards desired defaults (Beshears et al., 2009; Johnson & Goldstein, 
2003) or social contexts that provide goal support (Briskin et al., 2019; Fitzsimons & Shah, 
2008). Yet other approaches have focused on goal-specific factors that improve performance, 




specificity (Locke & Latham, 1990; Mento et al., 1987), or the extent to which goals align with 
an individual’s interests and values (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999; Sheldon & Houser-Marko, 2001).  
Beyond these factors, a nascent area of research is beginning to examine the role of meta-
level processes in motivation—metamotivation—as another element that may have implications 
for when and why individuals succeed or fail in pursuit of their goals (Miele et al., 2020; Scholer 
& Miele, 2016; Scholer et al., 2018). This approach builds on work about individual's lay beliefs 
about the way the world works (e.g., Dweck, 2006) to suggest that individuals, based on their 
beliefs and knowledge about how motivation works, may take an active role in directing their 
motivation in ways that can support versus undermine the likelihood of goal success. Prior work 
has examined the nature of people's motivational knowledge, but the current paper is the first 
examination of whether one specific form of this metamotivational knowledge—people’s 
metamotivational knowledge of task-motivation fit in the domain of regulatory focus—predicts 
performance.     
Metamotivation  
As noted above, metamotivation refers to the processes and knowledge involved in 
regulating one’s own motivational states (Miele et al., 2020; Scholer & Miele, 2016; Scholer et 
al., 2018). Building especially on insights from the metacognition (Flavell, 1979) and 
metamemory literatures (Nelson & Narens, 1990) and a long tradition of the study of motivation 
regulation in educational psychology (Boekaerts, 1995, 1996; Schunk & Zimmerman, 1994; 
Schwinger & Otterpohl, 2017; Wolters, 2003, 2011; Wolters et al., 2011), this emerging area of 
research examines what people know about managing both the quantity and quality of their 
motivation. Metamotivation consists of two reciprocal processes—metamotivational monitoring, 




metamotivational control, which involves identifying and implementing strategies to upregulate 
or sustain desired motivational states (Miele & Scholer, 2018). Critically, the effectiveness of 
both monitoring, as well as control, is posited to rely on people’s knowledge about how 
motivation works.  
Recent work in metamotivation has focused particular attention on what people know 
about the regulation of qualitative differences in motivation. Long traditions in motivation 
science have distinguished between qualitative differences in motivation type (Deci & Ryan, 
2000; Higgins, 1997; Liberman & Trope, 2008; Trope & Liberman, 2000). Research provides 
evidence that qualitatively distinct types of motivations can be helpful, harmful, or irrelevant 
depending on the situation (e.g., Fujita et al., 2019; Sansone, 2009; Scholer & Higgins, 2012). 
For example, research in regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) has shown that promotion 
motivation (enthusiastically seeking opportunities for gains, advancement, or growth) best 
supports innovation when inventing a new product, whereas prevention motivation (carefully 
protecting against potential losses or other negative outcomes) is particularly effective when it 
comes time to carefully ensure that the product meets all safety standards. In other words, there 
are times when either a promotion or prevention motivational state will lead to more optimal 
performance on a certain type of task, identified as regulatory focus task-motivation fit (Scholer 
& Miele, 2016).  
Metamotivational Knowledge of Regulatory Focus Task-Motivation Fit 
Initial forays in metamotivational knowledge have examined what people know about 
this type of self-regulatory challenge—knowing what type of motivation is optimal for tasks that 
vary in their motivational affordances. Specifically, Scholer & Miele (2016) assessed what 




theory distinguishes between two primary motivational systems, promotion and prevention, 
which serve distinct but necessary survival needs (Higgins, 1997). Predominantly promotion-
focused individuals represent their goals as hopes and aspirations and are maximally sensitive to 
the presence of gains and the absence of non-gains. To achieve their goals, promotion-focused 
individuals prefer eager strategies of goal pursuit (Scholer et al., 2019). In contrast, 
predominantly prevention-focused individuals represent their goals as duties and responsibilities 
and are maximally sensitive to the absence of losses and the presence of non-losses. To achieve 
their goals, prevention-focused individuals prefer vigilant strategies of goal pursuit (Scholer et 
al., 2019). 
 Importantly, prior work reveals that performance in some situations is enhanced by 
promotion motivation, whereas performance in other situations is enhanced by prevention 
motivation. For example, performance on eager tasks that rely primarily on divergent or 
associative thinking (e.g., a brainstorming task) benefit most from promotion motivation which 
supports enthusiastically seeking opportunities for gains and processing information in a 
creative, flexible manner (Beuk & Basadur, 2016; Bittner et al., 2016; Friedman & Förster, 2001; 
though see Baas et al., 2011). On the other hand, for vigilant tasks that require convergent 
thinking and attending to errors (e.g., proofreading a text), performance is enhanced by 
prevention motivation which supports protecting against potential losses and processing 
information in a careful manner (Förster et al., 2003; Seibt & Förster, 2004) 
Scholer and Miele (2016) assessed metamotivational knowledge by having participants 
complete a recall preference measure in which they reported their preferences for engaging in 
different recall activities (neutral, promotion-inducing, or prevention-inducing) as preparatory 




American samples, Scholer & Miele (2016) found that people on average demonstrated 
knowledge of task-motivation fit in this domain, such that they rated promotion-inducing recall 
activities as preferable for eager vs. vigilant tasks and prevention-inducing recall activities as 
preferable for vigilant vs. eager tasks. At the same time, there was significant variability in the 
accuracy of this knowledge, and variation in this knowledge is related to consequential behaviors 
such as choosing what task to engage in based on a given motivational state (Scholer & Miele, 
2016) or appropriately motivating others for work tasks with distinct demands (Jansen et al., 
2020). However, no work to date has examined whether this knowledge is related to better goal-
relevant task performance. 
The Present Research  
Across two studies, the present research tests whether metamotivational knowledge of 
regulatory focus task-motivation fit predicts performance in single-shot lab tasks. First, in an 
initial session, participants completed the knowledge assessment measure created by Scholer & 
Miele (2016), in which they reported their preferences for engaging in different recall activities 
as preparatory exercises for eager and vigilant tasks. Then, in a second session, participants were 
randomly assigned to complete either an eager (brainstorming; Friedman & Förster, 2001) or 
vigilant (proofreading; Förster et al., 2003) task. I hypothesized that metamotivational 
knowledge of regulatory focus task-motivation fit would predict better task performance in the 
second session.  
Given that Study 1b represents a near-direct replication of Study 1a, I present combined 
analyses for these studies. Combining the studies allows for more precise estimates of effect 
sizes and is consistent with recent recommendations to evaluate evidence across all data 




2016; McShane & Böckenholt, 2017). The data reported in the manuscript comprise all the data 
that we have collected to test these hypotheses. As I discuss in depth below, the observed effect 
differs for Study 1a versus 1b; the detailed analyses for each sample are presented in the various 
appendices and I discuss potential interpretations in the discussion. 
Method 
Participants 
Undergraduate participants at the University of Waterloo (N = 336; Mage = 20.15, SDage = 4.24; 
245 women, 89 men, 4 did not report gender) completed a two-part online study in exchange for 
course credit (Study 1a: N = 169, Mage = 20.14, SDage = 4.25, 130 women, 39 men; Study 1b: N = 
167, Mage = 20.16, SDage = 4.23, 115 women, 50 men, 4 did not report gender). There were no 
significant main effects or interactions with gender, so this variable is not discussed further. My 
goal was to recruit as many participants as possible over the course of each semester, especially 
given the possibility of attrition in this two-part study.1 With a final combined N of 336, we had 
99% power to detect an effect as small as f2 = 0.09 for the primary analysis of our hypothesis – a 
linear multiple regression analysis (two-tailed, 8 predictors). This was a larger study, of which 
the current investigation was one component.2   
 
1 The attrition rates varied significantly between the two samples because of some unintended idiosyncrasies with 
the way the 2-part study was set-up in the participant pool for Study 1a. For Study 1a, many participants who 
completed Part 1 were unable to sign-up for Part 2. 311 participants completed Part 1 of the study, but many of those 
participants had received their maximum allowance of credits and were not permitted to automatically sign up for 
Part 2. I worked with the participant pool program coordinator to implement a manual override to allow participants 
to sign-up for Part 2 by sending group and individual emails to the original participants. This effort resulted in 171 
participants who completed both sessions for Study 1a (two of those participants did not complete any measures in 
Part 1, resulting in 169 total participants for Study 1a). In Study 1b, this issue was addressed (see Procedure section) 
and attrition was notably less; 167 of the 234 participants who completed Part 1 also completed Part 2. 
2 Studies 1a and 1b included additional measures beyond the primary construct of interest (lay beliefs of motivation, 
adapted from King, 2019; proactive personality, Bateman & Crant, 1993; and construal level task-motivation fit 






In Part 1 participants completed a measure of regulatory focus metamotivational knowledge 
(Scholer & Miele, 2016). In Part 2, participants were randomly assigned to complete either a 
brainstorming or proofreading task. There were some variations in the length of time between 
sessions in the two samples. In Study 1a the time between study sessions ranged from a few 
minutes to several weeks due to some idiosyncrasies related to the implementation of two-part 
studies in the participant pool. This issue was resolved in Study 1b, such that participants 
received a link to complete Part 2 three days after completing Part 1 and were told they had 
seven days to complete it. Importantly, time between sessions did not affect the results; details 
are presented in Appendix A. Furthermore, there was no difference in knowledge between those 
who completed both sessions versus session 1 only (see Appendix B). After completing the task, 
participants responded to task-related questions, were debriefed, and received their remaining 
course credit. 
 Materials 
  Regulatory Focus Metamotivational Knowledge Assessment. Participants completed 
an assessment of their metamotivational knowledge of regulatory focus used in prior work 
(Scholer & Miele, 2016; see Appendix C). Participants were told that they would see 
descriptions of tasks paired with a recall activity. For each pair, participants rated how much they 
would prefer to complete that recall activity (e.g., Please write about a time in the past when you 
felt you made progress toward being successful in life) before doing the task (e.g., Your goal is 
to imagine a future no one has seen before by seeing possibilities and occasions for 
advancement) on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). The regulatory focus knowledge 




focus, 4 prevention focus, 4 neutral). Thus, participants saw a total of 48 randomly presented 
task and recall activity pairs.  
 Task Performance.  In the second session of the study, participants were told: “On the 
next page you will be presented with a computer task designed to measure your performance. 
You will have 3 minutes to complete the task. Please click next when you are ready.” They were 
then randomly assigned in a between-participants manipulation to complete one of two of the 
following tasks: 
  Eager Task (Brainstorming).  Participants completed an unusual uses task (Guilford, 
1967; Friedman & Förster, 2001), which asks participants to come up with as many creative 
ways to use an inanimate object as possible in three minutes. Participants were given the 
following instructions: "For the brainstorming task, list as many creative ways to use a TIN CAN 
as possible. The ideas you write down should be neither typical nor virtually impossible.  Please 
list each of your ideas on a separate line in the space below.” Performance was assessed using 
two metrics: number of ideas and originality ratings (Baas et al., 2011). The number of ideas 
were measured by the counting the total number of non-redundant ideas generated by each 
participant. These ideas were then individually coded for originality. Six trained coders (three 
per study) who were blind to the hypothesis evaluated each use independently and in random 
order on originality, on a scale from 1 (not at all creative) to 7 (extremely creative). Participant 
originality scores were created by averaging the ratings for each use they generated. Interrater 
reliability was good (Cicchetti, 1994), with an intra-class correlation coefficient of .68 for Study 
1a and .80 for Study 1b. The two performance metrics were significantly but modestly 
correlated, r(161) = .23, p = .003. I created a composite creativity score (the average of the two 




transparency—given the modest correlation and given that the results differ depending on the 
metric—I also present the results in the main text for each metric separately (number of ideas 
and originality). To preview, the results using the composite creativity score parallel the results 
observed for the number of ideas metric. 
 Vigilant Task (Proofreading).  The proofreading task involved a 400-word text 
discussing psychological theories of attraction (see Förster et al., 2003). The text contained a 
total of 46 errors and participants had three minutes to identify as many as possible. Participants 
were given the following instructions: “Please proofread the following text AS QUICKLY AND 
AS ACCURATELY as you can. Click on any word that contains an error (and no other words).” 
Performance can be assessed based on the number of surface (e.g., misspellings of shorter words, 
such as “peple” versus  “people”; incorrect punctuation) and complex (e.g., misspellings of 
longer words, such as “affliation” versus “affiliation”; mistakes in subject verb agreement) errors 
participants identify (Förster et al., 2003). The correlation between these two performance 
metrics was r(170) = .43, p < .001. Given the relatively strong correlation and given that the 
results do not differ as a function of performance metric, I present the results in the main text for 
the total number of errors recognized per participant and, for full transparency, present the 
detailed analyses for each individual metric (surface and complex errors) in Appendices D and E.   
  Task-Related Variables (Skill, Enjoyment, and Familiarity). Participants then 
answered questions regarding the task (brainstorming or proofreading) they had just completed. 
Specifically, they responded to three questions designed to assess perceived task skill, 
enjoyment, and familiarity: How good are you at brainstorming (proofreading)? (1 = very bad, 6 




= very much); How often do you engage in brainstorming (proofreading)? (1 = never, 6 = very 
often). 
Results 
Metamotivational Knowledge of Regulatory Focus 
To examine participants' metamotivational knowledge about regulatory focus, I submitted their 
preference ratings to a 2 (task: eagerness vs. vigilance) x 3 (recall activity: promotion vs. 
prevention vs. neutral) repeated measures ANOVA.3 Results revealed a main effect of recall 
type, F(1.55, 519.10) = 47.75, p < .001, ηp
2 = .13, revealing that participants preferred promotion 
activities (M = 4.34, SD = 2.65) to both prevention activities (M = 3.71, SD = 1.28) and neutral 
activities (M = 3.63, SD = 1.45) at the p < .001 level; preference for prevention and neutral 
activities did not significantly differ (p = .336). There was no main effect of task type, F(1, 335) 
= 0.74, p = .391, ηp
2 = .002. As predicted and replicating past work (Scholer & Miele, 2016), 
results revealed a significant task x recall activity interaction, F(1.83, 614.48) = 31.06, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .09 (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Mean ± SE recall preferences as a function of recall type and task type. 
 
3 Results revealed a violation of sphericity for both the main effect of recall type, Mauchly’s W(2) = .71, p < .001, 































 To decompose this interaction, I first conducted simple slopes as a function of strategy. 
All simple slopes were consistent with past work (Jansen et al., 2020; Scholer & Miele, 2016). 
Participants preferred promotion recall activities when anticipating an eager task (M = 4.48, SD 
= 1.41) relative to a vigilance task (M = 4.18, SD = 1.41), t(335) = 5.66, p < .001, d = 0.31. By 
contrast, participants preferred prevention recall activities when anticipating a vigilance task (M 
= 3.90, SD = 1.44) relative to an eager task (M = 3.51, SD = 1.35), t(335) = 6.50, p < .001, d = 
0.35. There was no difference in preference for neutral recall activities when anticipating 
vigilance tasks (M = 3.62, SD = 1.63) vs. eagerness tasks (M = 3.63, SD = 1.52), t(335) = 0.03, p 
= .979, d = 0.001. These comparisons reflect knowledge of task-motivation fit.  
Next, I conducted simple slopes as a function of task. Comparing promotion, prevention, 
and neutral recall activities for eager tasks, participants preferred promotion activities to both 
prevention activities, t(335) = 13.77, p < .001, d = 0.75, and neutral activities, t(335) = 8.32, p < 
.001, d = 0.45 ; prevention and neutral ratings did not significantly differ, t(336) = 1.43, p = .153, 
d = 0.08. For vigilance tasks, participants once again preferred promotion activities to both 
prevention activities, t(335) = 4.49, p < .001, d = 0.24, and neutral activities , t(335) = 5.16, p < 
.001, d = 0.28. They also preferred prevention activities to neutral activities, t(335) = 2.65, p = 
.008, d = 0.14.  
In sum, replicating past work, participants demonstrated, on average, knowledge of task-
motivation fit (as indicated by the significant task x recall activity interaction). In addition, 
participants also demonstrated an overall preference for promotion activities, also consistent with 




Predicting Overall Task Performance from Total Metamotivational Knowledge 
Next, I conducted a regression analysis to examine whether participants’ 
metamotivational knowledge predicted their performance on eager and vigilant tasks (i.e., 
brainstorming and proofreading), above and beyond other variables that may be related to task 
performance (i.e., task skill, enjoyment, and familiarity); see Table 1 for zero-order correlations.  
To prepare the data, I standardized performance scores for both tasks – using the 
composite score for the brainstorming task and total number of errors detected for the 
proofreading task. I created an overall metamotivational knowledge index (M = 0.69, SD = 1.35) 
following the procedure used by Scholer & Miele (2016; [promotion recall preferences for eager 
tasks– prevention recall preference for eager tasks] + [prevention recall preferences for vigilant 
tasks– promotion recall preferences for vigilant tasks]). As can be observed in this index and 
consistent with the task x recall type interaction, on average participants had accurate 
knowledge, but there was also significant variability in this knowledge. Continuous predictors 
were mean centered in all regression analyses in this set of studies. Task type was effects-coded 
(brainstorming coded -1), as was study (Study 1a coded -1). See Table 2 for descriptive statistics 
of Session 2 variables. 
I regressed participants’ performance scores on study, task type, task skill, task 
enjoyment, task familiarity, total knowledge, and the interactions between total knowledge and 
both task type and study. This model was significant, F(8, 325) = 5.04, p < .001, R2 = .11 (see 
Table 3). As one might expect, task enjoyment and task skill predicted performance. In addition, 
as predicted, participants’ total metamotivational knowledge was related to task performance. 







performance on both tasks (i.e., there was no task type x knowledge interaction).4 There was a 
marginal interaction between knowledge and study, indicating that the effect of knowledge on 
performance was likely moderated by study (as also indicated by looking at the raw 
correlations). Knowledge emerged as a significant predictor of task performance in Study 1a (b = 
0.19, p = .001), but not in Study 1b (b = 0.03, p = .640; see Appendix F). 
Table 1 
Zero-Order Correlations 














0.16 0.16 0.01 0.24 0.24 0.16 
.004 .004 .807 < .001 .001 .002 
Study 1a 
0.21 0.23 -0.01 0.18 0.22 0.14 
.005 .003 .905 .019 .004 .062 
Study 1b 
0.10 0.07 0.04 0.29 0.26 0.17 

































































































































































Note. Total RF Knowledge represents the knowledge score obtained using the overall metamotivational            
          knowledge index. 
          Eager and Vigilant Knowledge represent the two separate components that make up this index. 
 
4Although there was no task type x knowledge interaction, we also ran separate models for each task and for each 






Task performance descriptive statistics. 






Task Performance Metric     M (SD) Min-Max M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Brainstorming  Composite  5.48 (2.29) 0-12.5 3.46 (1.05) 3.56 (1.38) 3.26 (1.27) 
 Number of Ideas 7.41 (4.29) 0-21    
 Idea Originality 3.06 (0.64) 0-5    
Proofreading Number of Errors 12.38 (6.33) 0-34 3.61 (1.15) 3.46 (1.59) 3.44 (1.40) 
 
Table 3 
Regression analyses predicting task performance from total knowledge, controlling for study and 
task type, skill, enjoyment, and familiarity. 
Predictors B SE β t p 95% CI 
Intercept -0.25 0.17 
 
-1.99 .047 [-0.50, 0.003] 
Total Knowledge 0.11 0.04 .15 2.70 .007 [0.03, 0.18] 
Task Type 0.08 0.05 .02 .34 .737 [-0.08, 0.12] 
Study -0.03 0.05 -.03 -.59 .556 [-0.13, .07] 
Task Skill 0.11 0.06 .12 1.83 .069 [-0.01, 0.23] 
Task Enjoyment 0.09 0.04 .14 2.17 .031 [0.01, 0.17] 
Task Familiarity 0.04 0.05 .05 0.81 .421 [-0.05, 0.13] 
Knowledge*Task Type 0.06 0.04 .08 1.41 .159 [-0.02, 0.14] 
Knowledge*Study -0.08 0.04 -.11 -1.96 .051 [-0.16, 0.003] 
 
How do Eager and Vigilant Knowledge Relate to Overall Performance?  
To examine the extent to which eager versus vigilant knowledge accounted for the 
performance effects, I calculated separate indices for eager knowledge (promotion recall 
preferences for eager tasks– prevention recall preference for eager tasks) and vigilant knowledge 
(prevention recall preferences for vigilant tasks– promotion recall preferences for vigilant tasks) 
and examined their relation with overall performance, using the composite scores from the 
previous analysis. This model was significant, F(11, 332) = 3.96, p < .001, R2 = .12 (see Table 
4). Results revealed a main effect of eager knowledge on task performance; there was no 




vigilant knowledge on task performance. Rather, there was a significant task type x vigilant 
knowledge interaction, such that vigilant knowledge was only a significant predictor of 
performance on the vigilant task.  
Table 4 
Regression analyses predicting task performance from eager and vigilant knowledge, controlling 
for study and task type, skill, enjoyment, and familiarity. 
 Predictors b SE β t p 95% CI 
Task Performance Intercept -0.26 .13  -2.07 .039 [-0.51, -0.01] 
 Eager Knowledge 0.12 .05 .16 2.67 .008 [0.03, 0.22] 
 Vigilant Knowledge 0.07 .05 .08 1.39 .166 [-0.03, 0.17] 
 Task Type 0.01 .05 .01 0.25 .803 [-0.09, 0.12] 
 Study -0.03 .05 -.03 -0.60 .547 [-0.13, 0.07] 
 Task Skill 0.10 .06 .12 1.70 .090 [-0.02, 0.22] 
 Task Enjoyment 0.10 .04 .15 2.26 .025 [0.01, 0.18] 
 Task Familiarity 0.03 .05 .05 0.73 .464 [-0.06, 0.12] 
 Eager*Task Type 0.03 .05 .04 0.62 .539 [-0.06, 0.12] 
 Vigilant*Task Type 0.11 .05 .12 2.07 .039 [0.01, 0.21] 
 Eager*Study -0.09 .05 -.12 -1.96 .051 [-0.18, 0.004] 
 Vigilant*Study -0.05 .05 -.06 -1.07 .286 [-0.15, 0.05] 
Brainstorming Intercept 0.34 0.31  1.09 .276 [-0.28, 0.96] 
 Eager Knowledge 0.13 0.07 .16 1.86 .065 [-0.01, 0.26] 
 Vigilant Knowledge -0.003 0.08 -.003 -0.04 .968 [-0.16, 0.15] 
 Study -0.20 0.15 -.10 -1.31 .192 [-0.50, 0.10] 
 Task Skill -0.01 0.09 -.01 -0.12 .908 [-0.19, 0.17] 
 Task Enjoyment -0.03 0.07 -.04 -0.37 .710 [-0.16, 0.15] 
 Task Familiarity 0.20 0.08 .25 2.61 .010 [0.05, 0.35] 
 Eager*Study -0.07 0.07 -.09 -0.98 .328 [-0.20, 0.07] 
 Vigilant*Study -0.07 0.08 -.07 -0.85 .398 [-0.22, 0.17] 
Proofreading Intercept -0.46 0.27  -1.72 .087 [-0.98, 0.07] 
 Eager Knowledge 0.14 0.06 .18 2.20 .029 [0.01, 0.26] 
 Vigilant Knowledge 0.17 0.07 .21 2.62 .010 [0.04, 0.30] 
 Study 0.02 0.14 .01 0.12 .908 [-0.27, 0.30] 
 Task Skill 0.18 0.08 .21 2.27 .025 [0.02, 0.33] 
 Task Enjoyment 0.16 0.05 .26 2.97 .003 [0.05, 0.27] 
 Task Familiarity -0.05 0.06 -.07 -0.89 .374 [-0.16, 0.06] 
 Eager*Study -0.13 0.06 -.17 -2.06 .041 [-0.25, -0.01] 
 Vigilant*Study -0.07 0.07 -.09 -1.07 .287 [-0.20, 0.06] 
There was also a marginal interaction between study and eager knowledge that paralleled 




eager knowledge emerged as a significant predictor of performance in Study 1a, but not Study 
1b; see Appendix E). There was no significant interaction between study and vigilant knowledge.  
How do Eager and Vigilant Knowledge Relate to Performance on Each Task Metric?  
To explore the impact of knowledge on performance in a more fine-grained fashion, I 
examined the association of eager knowledge (promotion recall preferences for eager tasks– 
prevention recall preference for eager tasks) and vigilant knowledge (prevention recall 
preferences for vigilant tasks– promotion recall preferences for vigilant tasks) separately with 
each metric of task performance (brainstorming: number of ideas, brainstorming: originality, and 
proofreading errors). I regressed each performance metric on eager knowledge, vigilant 
knowledge, study, task skill, task enjoyment, task familiarity, and the interactions between both 
types of knowledge and study. These analyses allow us to examine if these knowledge 
components are more closely associated with the relevant task (e.g., if eager knowledge uniquely 
predicts performance on the eager task) or are more strongly related to performance on particular 
metrics. Because the results differ for the two metrics on the brainstorming task, I present the 
analyses for each metric separately in the main text. Appendix E contains the analyses for the 
brainstorming composite (which parallels the results for the number of ideas metric) and the two 




 Brainstorming: Total Number of Ideas.  This model was significant, F(8, 155) = 2.24, p 
= .027, R2 = .10 (see Table 5). As one might expect, task familiarity predicted the total number of 
ideas generated. In addition, participants’ eager metamotivational knowledge was related to the 
total number of ideas generated for the brainstorming task, while vigilant knowledge was not. 
Study did not moderate this effect.  
Table 5 
Regression analyses predicting brainstorming performance (total number of ideas) from eager 
and vigilant knowledge, controlling for study and task skill, enjoyment, and familiarity. 
Predictors B SE β t p 95% CI 
Intercept 8.23 0.87 
 
9.42 <.001 [6.50, 9.99] 
Eager Knowledge 0.59 0.29 .17 1.99 .048 [0.01, 1.17] 
Vigilant Knowledge -0.05 0.35 -.01 -0.14 .890 [-0.74, 0.64] 
Study -0.50 0.33 -.12 -1.52 .132 [-1.16, 0.15] 
Task Skill 0.04 0.40 .01 0.10 .918 [-0.75, 0.83] 
Task Enjoyment -0.16 0.29 -.05 -0.55 .586 [-0.74, 0.42] 
Task Familiarity 0.79 0.34 .23 2.34 .021 [0.12, 1.46] 
Eager*Study -0.27 0.29 -.08 -0.93 .353 [-0.85, 0.31] 
Vigilant*Study -0.27 0.34 -.07 -0.79 .433 [-0.94, 0.41] 
 
 Brainstorming: Originality.  This model was not significant, F(8, 155) = 1.17, p = .322, 
R2 = .06 (see Table 6). None of the variables emerged as significant predictors of brainstorming 
originality, though task familiarity was marginally significant.  
 
Table 6 
Regression analyses predicting brainstorming performance (originality) from eager and vigilant 
knowledge, controlling for study and task skill, enjoyment, and familiarity. 
Predictors B SE β t p 95% CI 
Intercept 2.96 0.13 
 
22.15 <.001 [2.69, 3.22] 
Eager Knowledge -0.003 0.05 -.01 -0.06 .950 [-0.09, 0.09] 
Vigilant Knowledge -0.03 0.05 -.05 -0.57 .569 [-0.14, 0.08] 
Study 0.06 0.05 .09 1.13 .261 [-0.04, 0.16] 
Task Skill -0.04 0.06 -.06 -0.62 .539 [-0.16, 0.08] 
Task Enjoyment 0.04 0.05 .08 0.82 .415 [-0.05, 0.13] 
Task Familiarity 0.10 0.05 .18 1.85 .066 [-0.01, 1.00] 
Eager*Study -0.04 0.05 -.07 -0.78 .435 [-0.12, 0.05] 




Proofreading: Total Errors.  This model was significant, F(8, 160) = 5.48, p < .001, R2 = 
.22 (see Table 7). As one might expect, task skill and task enjoyment predicted performance. Of 
note, participants’ eager and vigilant metamotivational knowledge were both related to the total 
number of errors identified in the proofreading task. There was also an interaction between eager 
knowledge and study, indicating that the effect of eager knowledge on performance was 
moderated by study. Eager knowledge emerged as a significant predictor of proofreading 
performance in Study 1a (b = 1.72, p = .005), but not in Study 1b (b = 0.05, p = .927; see 
Appendix E for details of these analyses). There was no significant interaction between vigilant 
knowledge and study. 
 
Table 7 
Regression analyses predicting proofreading performance (total errors) from eager and vigilant 
knowledge, controlling for study and task skill, enjoyment, and familiarity. 
Predictors B SE β t p 95% CI 
Intercept 9.61 1.01 
 
9.48 <.001 [7.61, 11.61] 
Eager Knowledge 0.87 0.39 .18 2.23 .027 [0.10, 1.64] 
Vigilant Knowledge 1.10 0.42 .21 2.63 .009 [0.27, 1.92] 
Study -0.45 0.45 -.07 -0.99 .324 [-1.34, .45] 
Task Skill 1.11 0.49 .20 2.25 .026 [0.14, 2.08] 
Task Enjoyment 1.01 0.34 .26 2.98 .003 [0.34, 1.68] 
Task Familiarity -0.31 0.35 -.07 -0.89 .376 [-1.01, 0.39] 
Eager*Study -0.82 0.39 -.17 -2.10 .037 [-1.59, -0.05] 
Vigilant*Study -.464 0.42 -.090 -1.111 .268 [-1.29, 0.36] 
 
General Discussion 
The successful pursuit of goals is vital for individual and societal well-being, yet it is 
challenging. The current work provides an initial examination of whether metamotivational 
knowledge of regulatory focus task-motivation fit predicts performance. There were several 
notable findings, each of which will be considered in more detail below. First, metamotivational 




metamotivational knowledge of regulatory focus task-motivation fit can be associated with 
performance. Second, eager knowledge was associated with the total number of ideas generated 
on the brainstorming task, but not the coded originality of the responses, suggesting that eager 
knowledge was not equally related to these components of creativity. Third, eager knowledge 
was related to performance on both the brainstorming and proofreading task, whereas vigilant 
knowledge was related to performance only on the proofreading task. Fourth, the relationship 
between metamotivational knowledge and performance was consistently observed in Study 1a 
but not 1b.  
Implications 
By demonstrating a positive relation between metamotivational knowledge of regulatory 
focus task-motivation fit and performance, the current work advances our understanding of 
factors that may contribute to successful goal pursuit. Previous research in the regulatory focus 
domain has emphasized that being in the right motivational state for a given task – i.e., having 
task-motivation fit – leads to increased performance (Freitas & Higgins, 2002; Higgins, 2000, 
2005; Motyka et al., 2014; Scholer et al., 2014). The metamotivational framework, however, 
postulates that what may also be important is people’s awareness of this task-motivation fit and 
their ability to create it themselves to promote goal-directed outcomes. Across several studies, 
researchers have demonstrated that people are on average accurate in their regulatory focus 
metamotivational beliefs (Scholer & Miele, 2016; Jansen et al., 2020). However, no research to 
date has provided evidence for the performance benefits of having this knowledge in the 
regulatory focus domain (Miele et al., 2020). Notably, these findings emerged even while 
controlling for skill, enjoyment, and frequency of engaging in these types of tasks – i.e., 




Further, the present work has important implications for the study of goal pursuit and 
self-regulation more broadly. Prior research has explored a number of factors in explaining why 
some people perform better on their goals than others, including differences in general 
capabilities (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Mikaye & Friedman, 2012), contextual factors 
(Milyavskaya & Inzlicht, 2017; Briskin et al., 2019), or goal-specific factors (Locke et al., 1998; 
Sheldon & Houser-Marko, 2001). The current thesis suggests that metamotivational knowledge 
could also be an important predictor of goal success. These findings suggest that it may be 
beneficial to consider how to develop interventions aimed at increasing people’s 
metamotivational knowledge in order to increase self-regulatory effectiveness.  
Previous interventions designed to increase performance have often focused on strategies 
targeted at changing these more general capacities or situational factors – for example, bolstering 
motivation by writing about the value and usefulness of a task (Hulleman & Harackiewicz, 
2009), or reflecting on one’s mastery of a skill to increase goal adoption (Bernacki et al., 2014). 
One limitation of these approaches is that they often, at least implicitly, imply a “one size fits 
all” approach to motivation, suggesting that one type of approach will generally be beneficial 
(“the fallacy of uniform efficacy”; Bonanno & Burton, 2013). In contrast, a metamotivational 
intervention approach could be built around improving people’s knowledge of “if…then” 
contingencies in motivational effectiveness. One strength of this approach is that it recognizes 
that any given individual will likely face a unique combination of self-regulatory obstacles 
standing in their way of successful goal performance, and therefore the intervention may better 
equip them to flexibly navigate these challenges (Miele et al., 2020). Examining how to 





The Dynamic Relation Between Knowledge and Performance 
One unexpected finding in the present work is the relation between metamotivational 
knowledge and performance appearing in Study 1a, but not Study 1b. As detailed in Appendix G, 
there were no clear differences between the samples in terms of demographics or performance 
level that can easily explain this unpredicted difference. Rather, I think this may be due to both 
the nature of the performance assessment—a single-shot, 3-minute task—and the dynamics of 
how metamotivational knowledge gets translated into action. In other words, I believe this 
variability in the apparent robustness of the effect is conceptually meaningful for understanding 
when and why metamotivational knowledge may be directly associated with performance.   
Although speculative, many factors likely influence the probability that knowledge will 
get effectively translated into performance. In any given situation, the likelihood that an 
individual's metamotivational knowledge is reflected in their performance may be affected by 
several factors, such as their awareness of their current motivational state (self-knowledge), 
knowledge and beliefs about other viable strategies (see Nguyen et al., 2019), and their 
investment in the task. Further, there are a number of different ways that individuals may deploy 
their knowledge that were not available to participants in this single-shot performance 
opportunity where the task was assigned. I explore these ideas below. 
Opportunities 
In many contexts, people have the option to regulate goal performance not only by 
selecting a motivational strategy for a given task (e.g., “I’ll think about what I can gain by doing 
well on this task!”), but by selecting a task based on a current motivational state (“I’m feeling 




only way to create task-motivation fit is to change or sustain a desired motivational orientation 
via the strategies one uses. Not only were participants constrained in this way, but they also may 
not have had the same strategies available to them that they typically would spontaneously use or 
may not have been able to quickly generate strategies in this unfamiliar context. Thus, when 
performance is a brief, single-shot opportunity such as the paradigm in the present study, there is 
only one chance for these factors to align such that a direct association between knowledge and 
performance is observed.  
Many self-regulatory situations, however, provide multiple opportunities for people to 
pursue their goals more or less effectively. For instance, students in a college course have many 
occasions that contribute to their learning and performance. Support for this possibility comes 
from one of my papers in preparation (in a study that was run by colleagues at The Ohio State 
University; Ross et al., 2020). Specifically, we examined whether students’ metamotivational 
knowledge predicts their final grade in an undergraduate psychology course (Introduction to 
Psychology) – a situation which offers numerous opportunities for knowledge to shape 
outcomes. 
 Individuals recruited from an introductory psychology course over the course of two 
semesters completed an assessment of their metamotivational knowledge of regulatory focus 
along with various measures of traditional correlates of grades, including academic achievement 
motivation, history of academic success, high school GPA, gender, age, and major at the 
beginning of the semester. Final grades were obtained at the end of the course. We found support 
for our hypothesis – student’s knowledge of how to create regulatory focus fit predicted their 
performance in the course. Notably, these results are very robust, such that across both semesters 




performance (see Table 7). Indeed, both total metamotivational knowledge and its individual 
components (i.e., eager and vigilant knowledge) significantly predicted performance above and 
beyond traditional predictors of academic success.  
This study complements and extends the study in the current thesis, not only because it 
demonstrates that metamotivational knowledge predicts performance in distinct contexts, but 
also because it provides some initial support for the possibility that having multiple performance 
opportunities may be an important factor that determines whether knowledge gets translated into 
performance. In the case of the present multi-shot performance opportunity, students had the 
chance to take notes more or less effectively, read the text more or less effectively, study for 
exams more or less effectively, show up to class (or not), discuss the materials with peers and 
Table 7 
Regression analysis predicting final grades – Study conducted at The Ohio State University  
Predictors b SE β t p 95% CI 
Intercept 3.40 0.06  62.07 < .001 [3.29, 3.50] 
Total knowledge 0.18 0.04 .24 5.31 < .001 [0.12, 0.25] 
High school GPA 0.13 0.04 .17 3.53 < .001 [0.06, 0.21] 
Academic achievement motivation 0.03 0.04 .04 0.92 .357 [-0.04, 0.10] 
History of academic success 0.25 0.04 .33 7.14 < .001 [0.18, 0.32] 
Gender 0.11 0.07 .07 1.49 .138 [-0.03, 0.25] 
Age -0.10 0.04 -.12 -2.55 .011 [-0.17, -0.02] 
Major -0.003 0.11 -.001 -0.03 .978 [-0.22, 0.21] 
Study -0.02 0.07 -.01 -0.31 .760 [-0.16, 0.11] 
Total knowledge * Study -0.04 0.07 -.03 -0.60 .549 [-0.18, 0.09] 
Intercept 3.40 0.06  61.80 < .001 [3.29, 3.50] 
Eager knowledge 0.16 0.04 .21 4.31 < .001 [0.08, 0.23] 
Vigilant knowledge 0.07 0.04 .09 1.97 .050 [0.00002, 0.14] 
High school GPA 0.13 0.04 .17 3.47 .001 [0.06, 0.21] 
Academic achievement motivation 0.03 0.04 .04 0.90 .368 [-0.04, 0.10] 
History of academic success 0.25 0.04 .33 7.17 < .001 [0.18, 0.32] 
Gender 0.10 0.07 .06 1.37 .171 [-0.04, 0.24] 
Age -0.10 0.04 -.13 -2.59 .010 [-0.17, -0.02] 
Major -0.004 0.11 -.002 -0.04 .971 [-0.22, 0.21] 
Study -0.02 0.07 -.01 -0.27 .788 [-0.15, 0.12] 
Eager knowledge * Study -0.03 0.07 -.02 -0.39 .698 [-0.17, 0.11] 





instructors more or less effectively. They were able to select tasks based on their current 
motivational state or attempt to change their current motivational state to meet current task 
demands. They could experiment with the effectiveness of strategies across learning 
opportunities. Thus, situations such as this, that afford multiple opportunities for the application 




There is also likely significant variability in the extent to which participants are aware of 
their own motivational states and of the particular strategies that would be most be effective for 
them, and it is possible that having this knowledge influences whether metamotivational 
knowledge gets translated into performance. Indeed, the metamotivational framework proposes 
that having self-knowledge – i.e., insights into one’s motivational states and tendencies – is 
likely a crucial component for effective regulation of one’s own motivation (see Flavell, 1979; 
Pintrich, 2002 for related discussions in the realm of metacognition). Concerning the present 
work, having insight into one’s motivational states and tendencies, in addition to identifying the 
optimal motivational states for a given situation, may be an important factoring in determining 
whether knowledge enhances performance. For example, even if an individual knows that a 
brainstorming task is best tackled with a promotion motivation, they may not be able to 
accurately identify their current motivational state and consequently will not take the necessary 
steps to shift their motivational state if needed. Furthermore, they may be able to recognize the 
need to shift their current state but may not know which strategies would work most effectively 




Additional research is needed before we can fully understand the role of self-knowledge 
in performance. For instance, although people show some awareness for task-motivation fit/non-
fit (Appelt et al., 2010; Higgins, 2010; Spiegel et al., 2004), there is scant evidence to suggest 
that people can reliably report whether they are experiencing a promotion vs. prevention focus. 
Therefore, before we can assess whether individuals can accurately identify these motivational 
states, we first need a better understanding of what these motivational states subjectively feel like 
and what cues people use to recognize them. Miele and Scholer (2018) suggest that people may 
monitor their motivation by attending to their metamotivational feelings – i.e., a unique set of 
feelings and phenomenological experiences associated with different components of motivation 
– and thus is it possible that these feelings serve as cues for particular motivational states. This is 
an interesting area for future research. 
Furthermore, not much is currently known about how people’s implicit beliefs and 
theories of motivation affect their use of metamotivational knowledge. For example, do people 
think that motivation is a malleable state of which they have the power to mold and transform? 
And, if so, what effect does this have on the likelihood of one’s metamotivational knowledge 
being put into action? Previous research suggests that a person’s implicit beliefs can have an 
impact on their engagement with regulation strategies (King, 2019; Thoman et al., 2019). For 
example, Thoman et al. (2019) found that people who believed that interest was something that 
could be upregulated (i.e., believed that interest was malleable) were more likely to use interest 
regulation strategies during a boring task than those who held a more fixed theory of interest 
regulation. Hence, if someone does not think that motivation or any of its related components are 




explore people’s lay beliefs about motivation and how this affects the likelihood of 
metamotivational knowledge getting translated into performance.  
Availability of Motivational Strategies 
Situations may differ in the extent to which motivational strategies are available, whether 
this is due to situational constraints or shortcomings in one’s personal repertoire of strategies. 
For instance, there may be situational constraints in place that impede the translation of 
knowledge, such as insufficient time, planning, or resources. Indeed, for the tasks in the present 
study, participants were not given much time to prepare and relatively little information was 
given regarding how their performance would be assessed. This could have hindered their 
capacity to engage in strategies that would bolster the superior motivational state for that given 
situation.  
Furthermore, even if the situation does facilitate the translation of knowledge to 
performance, a person may have a limited repertoire of strategies they know how to use to 
upregulate a desired motivational state, and the feasibility of these strategies could vary in 
different situations. Having a limited repertoire of strategies is not something for which the 
current assessments of metamotivational knowledge accounts, as they measure people’s ability to 
recognize the task-strategy pairings being presented to them but fail to capture variability in how 
many strategies people actually have at their disposal. In addition, there could be significant 
differences in how well people can spontaneously generate effective strategies, particularly in 
contexts similar to those used in the present study that demand immediate action. Being able to 
recognize or spontaneously generate strategies in the moment may be an important determining 




Motivation to Self-Regulate 
It is possible that the relation between knowledge and goal performance depends on 
having the motivation to self-regulate in the first place. For instance, an individual may tick all of 
the boxes for these potentially important factors: they have knowledge of how to create task 
motivation fit; they are able to accurately identify their current motivational state and which 
strategies would be most optimal in a given context; the situation offers multiple opportunities to 
make use of such motivational strategies; and they have the belief, whether it be implicit or 
explicit, that motivation is a malleable state that can be actively shaped and guided. Nonetheless, 
even with all of these elements falling into place, it is possible that the individual will lack the 
necessary motivation to regulate their own motivation. Without this motivation, a person will be 
less likely to put their metamotivational knowledge into practice (Smit et al., 2017; Wolters & 
Benzon, 2013; Wolters & Rosenthal, 2000), and therefore will not experience any performance 
benefits. 
One reason someone may lack sufficient motivation to self-regulate is that the goal which 
they are pursuing is not one that is highly valued. For instance, we might expect that when the 
goal-domain is highly valued, participants might be more likely to deploy their knowledge. 
Indeed, Macgregor et al. (2017) found that individuals’ knowledge in the construal level domain 
predicted self-control success – particularly for those who were motivated by the self-control 
conflict. Thus, even though people may understand how to create task-motivation fit, they may 
lack the necessary motivation to use their metamotivational knowledge for a goal that is not 
highly valued (Miele & Scholer, 2018; Wolters & Rosenthal, 2000). Future work should further 
explore goal value to determine its role in the translation of knowledge to performance.  




Another noteworthy finding that emerged in the current work was that relation between 
the knowledge components and task performance was not symmetric. Eager knowledge was 
related to performance on both tasks, whereas vigilant knowledge was related to performance 
only on the proofreading task. It may seem particularly surprising that eager knowledge was 
related to performance on the proofreading task; why would an understanding of the relative 
advantages of promotion versus prevention motivation for eager tasks be associated with 
performance on vigilant tasks? There are a number of possibilities, of course, with interesting 
implications for investigating these relations further. One possibility is that understanding when 
a given motivation is not useful plays an important role in understanding when it is useful. 
Specifically, the knowledge that prevention motivation is less optimal than promotion motivation 
for eager tasks may contribute to a generalizable understanding of the trade-offs of these 
motivational states. Indeed, Nguyen et al. (2019) found a similar pattern in the relation between 
knowledge of construal level task-motivation fit and consequential strategy choices.  
It is also very likely that these tasks are not process pure. Thus, although I and others 
have characterized these as eager and vigilant tasks, and I do believe the dominant motivational 
affordances correspond to that, it may be that both eagerness and vigilance can contribute to 
performance, even if one motivational affordance is primary. Indeed, one methodological reality 
that may have contributed to the proofreading task being less than process pure could be related 
to the nature of the task appearance as programmed in Qualtrics, in which identified errors are, 
by default, highlighted in green (rather than crossed out). This presentation may have 
inadvertently made the finding of errors something that could be perceived both as eliminating a 
loss (taking away the error) and adding a gain (emphasizing the addition of another successful 




There were also notable differences with respect to the brainstorming task. As captured in 
Tables 4 and 5, while metamotivational knowledge was related to overall performance on the 
brainstorming task, this was driven by its relation to the number of ideas generated rather than 
the coded originality of the responses. Prior work in regulatory focus has shown that promotion 
motivation is related both to the number of ideas that people are likely to generate (Crowe & 
Higgins, 1997; Friedman & Förster, 2001) and the originality of those ideas (Beuk & Basadur, 
2016; Friedman & Förster, 2001). One might argue that the task instructions used in the current 
study placed greater emphasis on the number of ideas as the primary performance metric, and so 
one possibility is that the relationship was stronger for the number of alternatives generated 
because participants with greater knowledge might have been savvier and more likely to focus on 
that aspect of performance. It is also possible that greater knowledge of regulatory focus task-
motivation fit is more strongly related to the generation of many ideas (i.e., increased output), 
regardless of their uniqueness. It would be useful to examine how varying task instructions 
influences performance on different metrics. Future work could benefit from exploring this 
question using a variety of different regulatory focus tasks, which, as I discussed previously, may 
pull for different components of metamotivational knowledge.  
Normative vs. Idiographic Knowledge 
Until now, work in the metamotivational domain has explored knowledge of normative 
effects – i.e., whether participants understand the qualitatively distinct motivations that would 
best serve performance based on work drawn from the empirical literature. For instance, we 
know from previous research that people tend to do better on creativity tasks when they are in a 
promotion motivational state (Beuk & Basadur, 2016; Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Friedman & 




motivational state (Förster et al., 2003; Seibt & Förster, 2004). The existing methods for 
assessing metamotivational knowledge have measured people’s awareness of these types of 
effects, and the present thesis suggests that this type of knowledge does matter for performance. 
However, research has yet to explore how knowledge of one’s own past experiences – i.e., 
idiographic knowledge – interacts with normative knowledge, and the role it might play in 
performance. For example, people may decide which strategies to use in a given situation based 
on what has worked for them in the past, rather than what the research suggests would typically 
work best.  
People may develop these personal task-motivation associations in a number of ways, 
such as a particularly salient experience, or through trial-and-error wherein a person repeatedly 
experiences success (or avoids failure) using a particular strategy for certain types of tasks. 
Regardless of how it develops, there could be interesting implications in terms of how it affects 
performance. For instance, it may be especially useful to have this type of knowledge in 
situations where there is no one qualitative motivational state that can clearly be identified as 
superior. In that case, it may be best to use a motivational strategy that has worked in the past. 
On the other hand, for a task that has been repeatedly shown to be best performed with a certain 
approach, it may be more useful to have knowledge of normative effects. Additionally, it could 
be particularly useful to have both types of knowledge during those multi-shot performance 
opportunities discussed previously, as these situations allow for multiple opportunities for both 
types of knowledge to contribute to success.  
One question I think it would be particularly interesting to explore is how these two types 
of knowledge interact in a situation where one’s personal experiences conflict with what we see 




conflicting information, how would this influence performance? For example, if an individual is 
presented with a task that has been reliably shown to benefit from being in a vigilant state, but 
they have previously experienced success on similar tasks using strategies that enhance an eager 
state, would it be better to rely on one type of knowledge over the other? Although speculative, it 
is possible that idiographic knowledge may be a stronger predictor of performance particularly in 
situations in which motivational affordances are more muted or mixed (i.e., a situation that could 
benefit from vigilance but is not harmed by eagerness). These are exciting questions for future 
research.  
Limitations 
 One limitation of the present work, which I have alluded to throughout my discussion, is 
the measure used to assess metamotivational knowledge. As I mentioned, the existing knowledge 
measure assesses people’s ability to recognize task-motivation fit based on normative effects we 
see in the literature, such that scoring high on the accuracy index indicates that people recognize 
the normative benefits (or drawbacks) of the task-strategy pairings being presented to them. 
While assessing knowledge in this way is useful, it is also constrained in that it imposes a 
relatively narrow definition of what it means to have accurate metamotivational knowledge. That 
is to say, the current knowledge assessment fails to capture a number of potentially important 
factors, including whether people are able to spontaneously generate strategies in the moment, 
and whether their own prior experiences would conflict with these normative performance 
standards (i.e., whether an individual knows that eagerness generally works better for them). 
Therefore, the ability to fully understand the role of knowledge in performance may require 





 Another limitation of the current work is the relatively artificial nature of the lab 
performance tasks. The benefit of using the brainstorming and proofreading tasks is that prior 
work has shown that these specific tasks do have eager and vigilant motivational affordances, 
respectively (Beuk & Basadur, 2016; Friedman & Förster, 2001; Förster et al., 2003), and thus 
they provide a relatively “clean” test of people’s metamotivational knowledge in this domain. 
However, a significant downside of this paradigm is that the tasks are presumably low-stakes to 
most participants (there were no clear incentives for performing well). Furthermore, the study 
was conducted online, which reduced my capacity to control the environments in which 
participants were engaging with these tasks. Thus, the ability to generalize from these tasks to 
richer, more complex real-world contexts is constrained. While the data I described earlier in the 
General Discussion looking at effects of knowledge on course grades addresses some of these 
concerns, this is a limitation that needs to be further explored. Specifically, the robustness of the 
effect in the multi-shot performance opportunity compared to the single-shot task suggests that 
there may be value in exploring the complex relation between knowledge and performance in a 
longitudinal context. Doing so would provide insight into the dynamic relationship between 
metamotivational knowledge and performance, including how the various factors discussed in 
the present thesis might interact with knowledge to predict performance. In particular, I think the 
present work would benefit from a daily diary study to see how knowledge and other potentially 
relevant factors predict outcomes in daily life, especially as people deal with goal conflicts and 
other self-regulatory challenges.  
Conclusion 
The present research provides initial evidence that having metamotivational knowledge 




metamotivational knowledge was related to increased performance on brief, single-shot 
brainstorming and proofreading tasks. However, there was significant variability in the 
robustness of this relationship, signaling the need for further examination of the dynamics of 
how metamotivational knowledge gets translated into action. Future research can extend this 
work by examining potential moderators that could explain under which conditions does 
knowledge lead to enhanced performance. Furthermore, it will be important to extend this line of 
work to investigate the relation between knowledge and real-world outcomes. We find initial 
evidence for this in the study conducted at The Ohio State University in the context of academic 
goals; future work should explore this relationship in other goal domains. Finally, given that 
those who are able to effectively manage and pursue their goals experience benefits in a number 
of domains – including higher life satisfaction, better psychological adjustment, better 
achievement in work and academic domains, and fewer health problems (see Tangney et al., 
2004) – I would be interested in exploring whether we find a similar pattern on such outcomes 
among those with accurate metamotivational knowledge. These are all exciting questions for 
future research.  
In conclusion, by examining the role of metamotivational knowledge in goal-relevant 
task-performance, this research offers new insights for goal-pursuit and self-regulatory success. 
The more we understand about individuals’ beliefs and knowledge of motivation, the more we 
can think about how to target interventions effectively and think about where and when people 
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Is Time between Sessions related to Key Variables? 
Because of idiosyncrasies related to the implementation of the two-part study in Study 1a, 
the time between Part 1 and Part 2 ranged from a few minutes to several weeks. This was 
controlled for in Study 1b, with all participants receiving a link to complete Session 2 three days 
after completing Session 1, with instructions to finish within seven days of receiving the e-mail. 
Due to the range of time between sessions both within and between studies, we examined 
whether time between sessions affected the results. Results for the full sample as well as each 
study separately showed that time was not significantly correlated with performance (see Table 
A1) and did not interact with task type or knowledge to predict performance (see Table A2).  
 
Table A1 
Zero-order correlations: Time between sessions and performance 
 Full 
Sample 





































Regression analyses for Studies 1a and 1b: Metamotivational knowledge predicting task 
performance while controlling for task type and time between sessions. 
Study Predictors b SE β t p 95% CI 
1a Intercept -0.04 0.09 
 
-0.40 .691 [-0.21, 0.14] 
 Task Type -0.01 0.09 -.01 -0.14 .886 [-0.19, 0.17] 
 Time 0.0002 0.0002 .09 1.21 .227 [-0.0001, 0.001] 
 Total Knowledge 0.16 0.06 .23 2.60 .010 [0.04, 0.28] 
 Knowledge*Time -0.000003 0.0001 -.02 -0.24 .809 [-0.0002, 0.0002] 




1b Intercept 0.17 0.15  1.15 .254 [-0.12, 0.45] 
 Task Type -0.13 0.14 -.12 -0.90 .371 [-0.40, 0.15] 
 Time -0.002 0.001 -.20 -1.85 .066 [-0.003, 0.0001] 
 Total Knowledge 0.09 0.10 .12 0.90 .369 [-0.11, 0.30] 
 Knowledge*Time -0.0001 0.001 -.03 -0.24 .815 [-0.001, 0.001] 













































Full Sample Metamotivational Knowledge of Regulatory Focus Task-Motivation Fit 
The first analysis presented in the main text examines metamotivational knowledge of 
regulatory focus task-motivation fit, conducted on participants who completed both Parts 1 and 
2. We also conducted these analyses for the full sample who completed Part 1 (N = 558)—
reported below; the pattern of results is the same.  
Full Sample. To examine participants' metamotivational knowledge about regulatory 
focus, we submitted their preference ratings to a 2 (task: eagerness vs. vigilance) x 3 (recall 
activity: promotion vs. prevention vs. neutral) repeated measures ANOVA. Results revealed a 
main effect of recall type, F(1.55, 829.52) = 64.80, p < .001, ηp
2 = .11, revealing that participants 
preferred promotion activities (M = 4.33, SD = 1.30) to both prevention activities (M = 3.78, SD 
= 1.43) and neutral activities (M = 3.71, SD = 1.43) at the p < .001 level; preference for 
prevention and neutral activities did not significantly differ (p = .286). There was no main effect 
of task type, F(1, 536) = 1.34, p = .247, ηp
2 = .002. As predicted, results revealed a significant 
task x recall activity interaction, F(1.81, 969.06) = 44.97, p < .001, ηp
2 = .08 (see Figure B1). 
 Participants preferred promotion recall activities when anticipating an eager task (M = 
4.46, SD = 1.39) relative to a vigilance task (M = 4.19, SD = 1.39), t(536) = 6.56, p < .001, d = 
0.28. In contrast, participants preferred prevention recall activities when anticipating a vigilance 
task (M = 3.95, SD = 1.43) relative to an eager task (M = 3.58, SD = 1.41), t(536) = 7.79, p < 
.001, d = 0.34. There was no difference in preference for neutral recall activities when 
anticipating vigilance tasks (M = 3.70, SD = 1.61) vs. eagerness tasks (M = 3.70, SD = 1.54), 




Next, we conducted simple slopes as a function of task. Comparing promotion, 
prevention, and neutral recall activities for eager tasks, participants preferred promotion 
activities (M = 4.46, SD = 1.38) to both prevention activities (M = 3.59, SD = 1.41), t(538) = 
16.27, p < .001, d = 0.70 , and neutral activities (M = 3.71, SD = 1.53), t(538) = 9.68, p < .001, d 
= 0.42; prevention and neutral ratings did not significantly differ, t(539) = 1.84, p = .066, d = 
0.08. For vigilance tasks, participants once again preferred promotion activities (M = 4.19, SD = 
1.39) to both prevention activities (M = 3.96, SD = 1.43), t(339) = 4.98, p < .001, d = 0.21, and 
neutral activities (M = 3.70, SD = 1.61), t(339) = 6.02, p < .001, d = 0.26. They also preferred 
prevention activities to neutral activities, t(339) = 3.27, p = .001, d = 0.14.  
 
 




































Metamotivational Knowledge Assessment 
Eagerness Task Descriptions: 
1. Your goal is to be as creative as possible by seizing opportunities to take the ordinary and 
innovate. 
2. Your goal is to imagine a future no one has seen before by seeing possibilities and 
occasions for advancement. 
 
Vigilance Task Descriptions: 
1. Your goal is to be as accurate as possible by making sure to avoid lurking errors and 
pitfalls. 
2. Your goal is to be precise and make sure that you don’t make a wrong turn in figuring out  
 
Promotion Recall Activities: 
1. Please write about a time in the past when you felt you made progress toward being 
successful in life. 
2. Please write about a time in the past when compared to most people you were able to get 
what you wanted out of life. 
3. Please write about a time in the past when trying to achieve something important to you, 
you performed as well as you ideally would have liked to. 
4. Please write about your hopes and aspirations as a child. What accomplishments did you 
ideally want to meet when you were a child? 
 
Prevention Recall Activities: 
1. Please write about a time in the past when being careful enough avoided getting you into 
trouble. 
2. Please write about a time in the past when you stopped yourself from acting in a way that 
your parents would have considered objectionable.  
3. Please write about a time in the past when you were careful not to get on your parents’ 
nerves. 
4. Please write about your duties and obligations as a child. What responsibilities did you 
think you ought to meet when you were a child? 
 
Neutral Recall Activities:  
1. Please describe what your kitchen looked like when you were a child.  
2. Please describe the physical layout of the most recent restaurant you visited.  
3. Please describe the various floor surfaces in your home.  











How does Total Metamotivational Knowledge Relate to Performance? 
 
The main text presents the analyses for the relation between total knowledge and task 
performance, which was standardized using the composite score for the brainstorming task and 
total number of errors for the proofreading task. Here we present several additional analyses for 
full transparency. As can be seen in Tables D1, D2, and D3, there was no main effect of total 
knowledge on any of the three brainstorming performance metrics (i.e., composite score, number 
of ideas, and originality), nor was there an interaction between knowledge and study. Total 
knowledge was a significant predictor of the total number of proofreading errors detected (see 
Table D5, and these results do not differ as a function of proofreading performance metric (i.e., 
surface vs. complex errors; see Tables D6 and D7). There was a marginal interaction between 
total knowledge and both the total number of proofreading errors and number of surface-level 
errors. Results revealed a pattern similar to that of the analyses in the main text, such that there 
was a main effect of knowledge in Study 1a but not 1b. 
Table D1 
Regression analyses predicting brainstorming performance (composite score) from total 
knowledge, controlling for study and task skill, enjoyment, and familiarity 
Predictors B SE β t p 95% CI 
Intercept 5.61 0.45 
 
12.37 <.001 [4.71, 6.50] 
Total Knowledge 0.18 0.14 .11 1.30 .195 [-0.09, 0.45] 
Study -0.24 0.17 -.11 -1.38 .170 [-0.58, 0.10] 
Task Skill 0.01 0.21 .002 0.03 .980 [-0.41, 0.42] 
Task Enjoyment -0.07 0.15 -.04 -0.46 .646 [-0.37, 0.23] 
Task Familiarity 0.47 0.18 .26 2.68 .008 [0.12, 0.82] 




Regression analyses predicting brainstorming performance (number of ideas) from total 
knowledge, controlling for study and task skill, enjoyment, and familiarity 
Predictors B SE β t p 95% CI 
Intercept 8.27 0.87 
 




Total Knowledge 0.35 0.26 .11 1.35 .179 [-0.16, 0.87] 
Study -0.52 0.33 -.12 -1.57 .118 [-1.18, 0.13] 
Task Skill 0.10 0.40 .03 0.25 .801 [-0.69, 0.89] 
Task Enjoyment -0.19 0.29 -.06 -0.64 .523 [-0.76, 0.39] 
Task Familiarity 0.83 0.34 .24 2.44 .016 [0.16, 1.49] 




Regression analyses predicting brainstorming performance (originality) from total knowledge, 
controlling for study and task skill, enjoyment, and familiarity 
Predictors B SE β t p 95% CI 
Intercept 2.98 0.13 
 
22.57 <.001 [2.72, 3.24] 
Total Knowledge -0.01 0.04 -.02 -0.17 .864 [-0.09, 0.07] 
Study 0.06 0.05 .09 1.15 .251 [-0.04, 0.16] 
Task Skill -0.03 0.06 -.05 -0.51 .613 [-0.15, 0.09] 
Task Enjoyment 0.03 0.04 .06 0.64 .522 [-0.06, 0.12] 
Task Familiarity 0.09 0.05 .18 1.85 .066 [-0.01, 1.00] 




Regression analyses predicting proofreading performance from total knowledge, controlling for 
study and task skill, enjoyment, and familiarity 
 Predictors B SE β t p 95% CI 
Full Sample Intercept 9.69 1.01 
 
9.64 <.001 [7.71, 11.68] 
 Total Knowledge 0.98 0.34 .21 2.86 .005 [0.30, 1.66] 
 Study -0.41 0.44 -.07 -0.93 .357 [-1.28, 0.47] 
 Task Skill 1.10 0.49 .20 2.26 .025 [0.14, 2.06] 
 Task Enjoyment 1.01 0.34 .26 2.96 .003 [0.34, 1.67] 
 Task Familiarity -0.29 0.35 -.06 -0.81 .417 [-0.98, 0.41] 
 Knowledge*Study -0.65 0.34 -.14 -1.90 .059 [-1.33, 0.03] 
Study 1a Intercept 9.77 1.43  6.81 <.001 [6.91, 12.62] 
 Total Knowledge 0.71 0.68 .13 1.04 .301 [-0.65, 2.06] 
 Task Skill 1.16 0.48 .29 2.41 .018 [0.20, 2.13] 
 Task Enjoyment -0.37 0.53 -.08 -0.70 .489 [-1.42, 0.69] 
 Task Familiarity 1.65 0.55 .31 3.03 .003 [-0.57, 2.73] 
Study 1b Intercept 9.88 1.46  6.78 <.001 [6.98, 12.78] 
 Total Knowledge 1.59 0.72 .29 2.23 .029 [0.17, 3.02] 
 Task Skill 0.79 0.49 .21 1.63 .107 [-0.18, 1.76] 








Total knowledge predicting surface-level proofreading errors from total knowledge, controlling 
for study and task skill, enjoyment, and familiarity 
 Predictors B SE β t p 95% CI 
Full Sample Intercept 6.74 0.68 
 
9.94 <.001 [5.40, 8.07] 
 Total Knowledge 0.52 0.23 .17 2.23 .027 [0.06, 0.98] 
 Study -0.06 0.30 -.02 -0.21 .836 [-0.65, 0.53] 
 Task Skill 0.68 0.33 .19 2.07 .040 [0.03, 1.33] 
 Task Enjoyment 0.55 0.23 .22 2.43 .016 [0.10, 1.01] 
 Task Familiarity -0.39 0.24 -.13 -1.64 .104 [-0.86, 0.08] 
 Knowledge*Study -0.43 0.23 -.14 -1.84 .068 [-0.88, 0.03] 
Study 1a  Intercept 6.40 0.88  7.28 <.001 [6.91, 12.62] 
 Total Knowledge 0.24 0.42 .07 0.58 .564 [-0.65, 2.06] 
 Task Skill 0.75 0.30 .31 2.52 .014 [0.20, 2.13] 
 Task Enjoyment -0.55 0.32 -.20 -1.69 .095 [-1.42, 0.69] 
 Task Familiarity 0.96 0.33 .29 2.87 .005 [-0.57, 2.73] 
Study 1b Intercept 7.37 1.05  7.03 <.001 [6.98, 12.78] 
 Total Knowledge 1.24 0.52 .32 2.40 .018 [0.17, 3.02] 
 Task Skill 0.31 0.35 .12 0.88 .383 [-0.18, 1.76] 
 Task Enjoyment -0.23 0.34 -.08 -0.68 .497 [-1.15, 0.75] 




Total knowledge predicting contextual-level proofreading errors from total knowledge, 
controlling for study and task skill, enjoyment, and familiarity 
Predictors B SE β t p 95% CI 
Intercept 2.96 0.56  5.32 <.001 [1.86, 4.05] 
Total Knowledge 0.47 0.19 .18 2.45 .015 [0.09, 0.84] 
Study   -0.35 0.25 -.10 -1.42 .158 [-0.83, 0.14] 
Task Skill 0.42 0.27 .14 1.57 .119 [-0.11, 0.95] 
Task Enjoyment 0.45 0.19 .21 2.40 .017 [0.08, 0.82] 
Task Familiarity 0.10 0.19 .04 .52 .604 [-0.28, 0.49] 











How do Eager and Vigilant Metamotivational Knowledge Relate to Performance? 
 
As reported in the main text (see Table 4), we regressed participants’ overall performance 
on study, task skill, task enjoyment, task familiarity, eager and vigilant knowledge, and the 
interactions between both types of knowledge and study. There was a marginal interaction 
between study and eager knowledge that paralleled the pattern found with total knowledge. 
Running the regression analysis separately for each study, eager knowledge emerged as a 
significant predictor of performance in Study 1a, but not Study 1b (see Table E1).  
Table E1 
Regression analyses predicting task performance from eager and vigilant knowledge, controlling 
for study and task type, skill, enjoyment, and familiarity 
 Predictors b SE β T p 95% CI 
 Study 1a Intercept -0.29 0.19  -1.58 .117 [-0.66, 0.07] 
 Eager Knowledge 0.23 0.06 .31 3.70 <.001 [0.11, 0.35] 
 Vigilant Knowledge 0.11 0.08 .13 1.48 .140 [-0.04, 0.26] 
 Task Type 0.02 0.08 .02 00.29 .775 [-0.13, 0.17] 
 Task Skill 0.05 0.09 .05 0.53 .597 [-0.12, 0.21] 
 Task Enjoyment 0.10 0.06 .15 1.65 .101 [-0.02, 0.22] 
 Task Familiarity 0.05 0.07 .07 0.73 .466 [-0.09, 0.19] 
 Eager*Task Type 0.04 0.06 .06 .71 .478 [-0.08, 0.17] 
 Vigilant*Task Type 0.11 0.08 .12 1.49 .138 [-0.04, 0.26] 
Study 1b Intercept -0.16 0.18  -0.87 .385 [-0.52, 0.20] 
 Eager Knowledge 0.04 0.07 .05 0.57 .567 [-0.10, 0.18] 
 Vigilant Knowledge 0.02 0.07 .03 0.29 .772 [-0.12, 0.17] 
 Task Type -0.02 0.08 -.02 -0.25 .800 [-0.17, 0.13] 
 Task Skill 0.18 0.09 .20 2.03 .044 [0.01, 0.35] 
 Task Enjoyment 0.07 0.06 .11 1.14 .256 [-0.05, 0.19] 
 Task Familiarity 0.02 0.07 .02 0.29 .776 [0.11, 0.15] 
 Eager*Task Type -0.01 0.07 -.01 -0.07 .946 [-0.14, 0.13] 
 Vigilant*Task Type 0.10 0.07 .11 1.33 .187 [-0.05, 0.24] 
 
Brainstorming: Composite 
In this analysis, we examined the association of eager and vigilant knowledge separately 




eager knowledge on task performance; there was no main effect of vigilant knowledge on task 
performance. These results were consistent across Studies 1a and 1b (see Table E2).  
Table E2 
Regression analyses predicting brainstorming performance (composite score) from eager and 
vigilant knowledge, controlling for study and task skill, enjoyment, and familiarity 
Predictors B SE β t p 95% CI 
Intercept 5.58 0.46 
 
12.21 <.001 [4.68, 6.48] 
Eager Knowledge 0.29 0.15 .16 1.86 .065 [-0.02, 0.59] 
Vigilant Knowledge -0.01 0.18 -.003 -0.04 .968 [-0.37, 0.35] 
Study -0.23 0.17 -.10 -1.31 .192 [-0.57, 0.12] 
Task Skill -0.02 0.21 -.01 -0.12 .908 [-0.44, 0.39] 
Task Enjoyment -0.06 0.15 -.04 -0.37 .710 [-0.36, 0.25] 
Task Familiarity 0.46 0.18 .25 2.61 .010 [0.11, 0.80] 
Eager*Study -0.15 0.15 -.09 -0.98 .328 [-0.45, 0.15] 
Vigilant*Study -0.15 0.18 -.07 -0.85 .398 [-0.50, 0.20] 
 
Proofreading: Total Errors – Study Level Analysis 
As reported in the main text, we regressed participants’ proofreading performance on study, task 
skill, task enjoyment, task familiarity, eager and vigilant knowledge, and the interactions 
between both types of knowledge and study. As indicated in Table 7 in the main text, there was a 
significant interaction between eager knowledge and study, indicating that the effect of eager 
knowledge on proofreading performance was likely moderated by study. Conducting the 
regression analyses separately for each study, eager knowledge emerged as a significant 
predictor of proofreading performance in Study 1a (b = 1.72, p = .005), but not in Study 1b (b = 
0.05, p = .927; see Table E3). Additionally, although there was no significant interaction 
between vigilant knowledge and study, we see the same pattern emerge such that vigilant 
knowledge emerged as a significant predictor in Study 1a (b = 1.54, p = .022), but not in Study 
1b (b = 0.63, p = .242) 
Table E3 




 Predictors B SE β t p 95% CI 
Study 1a Intercept 9.72 1.45  6.71 <.001 [6.84, 12.61] 
 Eager Knowledge 1.72 .60 .35 2.88 .005 [0.53, 2.91] 
 Vigilant Knowledge 1.54 .66 .28 2.33 .022 [0.23, 2.85] 
 Task Skill .68 .69 .12 .98 .329 [-0.70, 2.05] 
 Task Enjoyment 1.17 .49 .29 2.40 .019 [0.20, 2.14] 
 Task Familiarity -.36 .53 -.08 -.67 .504 [-1.42, 0.70] 
Study 1b Intercept 9.76 1.46  6.682 <.001 [6.85, 12.70] 
 Eager Knowledge .05 .52 .010 .092 .927 [-0.99, 1.08] 
 Vigilant Knowledge .63 .53 .128 1.178 .242 [-0.43, 1.68] 
 Task Skill 1.62 .72 .295 2.266 .026 [0.20, 3.05] 
 Task Enjoyment .80 .49 .210 1.643 .104 [-0.17, 1.77] 
 Task Familiarity -.26 .48 -.059 -.543 .589 [-1.22, 0.70] 
 
Proofreading: Surface Errors 
In this analysis, we examined the association of eager and vigilant knowledge separately 
with the detection of surface-level proofreading errors. Results revealed a significant main effect 
of vigilant knowledge on proofreading performance; there was no main effect of eager 
knowledge. There was a significant interaction between study and eager knowledge that 
paralleled the pattern found with total knowledge (running the regression analysis separately for 
each study, eager knowledge emerged as a significant predictor of performance in Study 1a, but 
not Study 1b; see Table E4).  
Table E4 
Eager and Vigilant knowledge predicting surface-level proofreading errors 
 Predictors B SE β t p 95% CI 
Full Sample Intercept 6.66 0.68  9.81 <.001 [5.32, 8.00] 
 Eager Knowledge 0.36 0.26 .12 1.38 .169 [-0.16, 0.88] 
 Vigilant Knowledge 0.68 0.28 .21 2.45 .015 [0.13, 1.24]  
 Study -0.12 0.30 -.03 -0.39 .700 [-0.71, 0.48]  
 Task Skill 0.70 0.33 .20 2.11 .036 [0.05, 1.34] 
 Task Enjoyment 0.56 0.23 .22 2.46 .015 [0.11, 1.01] 
 Task Familiarity -0.42 0.24 -.15 -1.78 .077 [-0.89, 0.05] 
 Eager*Study -0.59 0.26 -.19 -2.26 .025  [-1.11, -0.08] 
 Vigilant*Study -0.25 0.28 -.07 -0.88 .380 [-0.80, 0.31] 
Study 1a Intercept 6.38 .89  7.18 <.001 [4.61, 8.15] 




 Vigilant Knowledge .91 .41 .28 2.25 .027 [0.11, 1.72] 
 Task Skill .23 .42 .07 .54 .590 [-0.61, 1.07] 
 Task Enjoyment .75 .30 .31 2.51 .014 [0.15, 1.34] 
 Task Familiarity -.54 .33 -.20 -1.66 .100 [-1.20, 0.11] 
Study 1b Intercept 7.24 1.04  6.95 <.001 [5.17, 9.32] 
 Eager Knowledge -.23 .37 -.07 -.61 .541 [-0.96, 0.51] 
 Vigilant Knowledge .43 .38 .13 1.13 .264 [-0.33, 1.18] 
 Task Skill 1.27 .51 .33 2.49 .015 [0.25, 2.29] 
 Task Enjoyment .32 .35 .12 .91 .367 [-0.38, 1.01] 
 Task Familiarity -.30 .34 -.10 -.87 .386 [-0.98, 0.38] 
 
Proofreading: Contextual Errors 
In this analysis, we examined the association of eager and vigilant knowledge separately 
with the detection of contextual-level proofreading errors. Results revealed a significant main 
effect of eager knowledge and a marginal main effect of vigilant knowledge on task 
performance. These results were consistent across Studies 1a and 1b (see Table E5).  
TableE5 
Eager and Vigilant knowledge predicting contextual-level proofreading errors 
 Predictors B SE β t p R2 
 Intercept 2.95 0.56  5.25 <.001 [1.84, 4.06] 
 Eager Knowledge 0.51 0.22 .20 2.34 .020 [0.08, 0.94] 
 Vigilant Knowledge 0.41 0.23 .15 1.78 .077 [-0.05, 0.87] 
 Study -0.33 0.25 -.10 -1.32 .190 [-0.82, 0.17] 
 Task Skill 0.41 0.27 .14 1.51 .134 [-0.13, 0.95] 
 Task Enjoyment 0.45 0.19 .21 2.39 .018 [0.08, 0.82] 
 Task Familiarity 0.11 0.12 .05 0.55 .583 [-0.28, 0.50] 
 Eager*Study -0.23 0.22 -.09 -1.06 .292 [-0.66, 0.20] 















Total Metamotivational Knowledge Predicting Overall Performance – Study Level 
Analysis 
 
As reported in the main text, we regressed participants’ performance scores on study, task 
type, task skill, task enjoyment, task familiarity, total knowledge, and the interactions between 
total knowledge and both task type and study. As indicated in Table 3 in the main text, there was 
a marginal interaction between knowledge and study, indicating that the effect of knowledge on 
performance was likely moderated by study. Conducting the regression analyses separately for 
each study, knowledge emerged as a significant predictor of task performance in Study 1a (b = 
0.19, p = .001), but not in Study 1b (b = 0.03, p = .599; see Table F1). 
Table F1 
Regression analyses for Studies 1a and 1b: Metamotivational knowledge predicting task 
performance while controlling for task type, skill, enjoyment, and familiarity 
 Predictors b SE β t p 95% CI 
Study 1a Intercept -0.26 0.18  -1.40 .164 [-0.62, 0.11] 
 Total Knowledge 0.19 0.06 .27 3.41 .001 [0.08, 0.30] 
 Task Type 0.03 0.08 .03 0.35 .724 [-0.13, 0.17] 
 Task Skill 0.06 0.08 .07 0.74 .458 [-0.10, 0.23] 
 Task Enjoyment 0.09 0.06 .13 1.47 .144 [-0.03, 0.21] 
 Task Familiarity 0.05 0.07 .07 0.76 .450 [-0.08, 0.19] 
 Knowledge*Task 
Type 
0.06 0.06 .09 1.10 .274 [-0.05, 0.17] 
Study 1b Intercept -.16 .18  -0.90 .370 [-0.52, 0.20] 
 Total Knowledge .03 .06 .04 0.53 .599 [-0.01, 0.15] 
 Task Type -.01 .08 -.01 -0.09 .927 [-0.16, 0.14] 
 Task Skill .18 .09 .20 2.02 .045 [0.004, 0.35] 
 Task Enjoyment .07 .06 .11 1.18 .239 [-0.05, 0.19] 
 Task Familiarity .03 .06 .04 0.43 .670 [0.10, 0.16] 
 Knowledge*Task 
Type 













Results revealed a consistent pattern such that the relation between metamotivational 
knowledge and performance was observed in Study 1a, but not Study 1b. There were no clear 
differences between the samples in terms of demographics or performance level that can easily 
explain this unpredicted difference (see Table G1) 
Table G1 
Study-level descriptive statistics 
 Mean (SD)   
 Study 1a Study 1b t p 
Age 20.14 (4.25) 20.16 (4.23) 0.04 .966 
Proofreading Performance 12.85 (6.44) 11.94 (6.22) 0.93 .351 
Brainstorming Performance 
(Composite) 
5.68 (2.10) 5.19 (2.37) 1.40 .163 
Brainstorming Performance 
(Number of Ideas) 
8.48 (4.20) 7.26 (4.51) 1.80 .074 
Brainstorming Performance 
(Originality)  
3.00 (0.53) 3.21 (0.73) 1.15 .252 
Metamotivational Knowledge 0.79 (1.39) 0.59 (1.29) 1.40 .164 
 
 
